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Recycled Music for Banal Nation:
The Case of Serbia 1999-2010
Srdan Atanetsovski
in this chapter I address the ways in which popular music genres
have been recycled in the Serbian post-socialist political landscape.
Specifically, I analyse how Western-styled music production was relo-
cated, both spatially and temporally, from being a vehicle of purported
'freedom of expression' in socialist Yugoslavia, to operating as a mecha-
nism of Serbian banal nationalism. During the 1990s, Serbian national-
ism emerged as an antagonistic force playing a crucial and dominant
role in the violent breakup of Yugoslavia and aiming to retain control
of vast swathes of land which were (in Serbian nationalistic discourse)
perceived as parts of Serbian national territory. The aggressiveness of
Serbian nationalism was reflected in various popular music genres, not
least in the infamous turbo-folk. Thus, it is important to trace the mech-
anisms whereby certain products of popular music, through processes of
spatiotemporal relocation, were employed in order to banalise the 'hot'
Serbian nationalism, and represent it in a different, Westernised light.
I will show how the pop and rock music became engrafted into seem-
ingly innocuous representations of Serbian patriotism, or 'civic nation-
alism', through widely accepted practices which were even perceived as
'above the political' in the everyday jargon.
Michael Billig (1995) defined banal nationalism as nationalism
which is reproduced in everyday, seemingly banal and innocuous
situations, thus becoming the omnipresent doxa and discourse that we
use in order to make sense of our everyday lives. Through its banality,
nationalism is transformed into 'patriotism', stripped of its negative
connotations and recognised as something positive. However, Bil l ig
positions his analysis of banal nationalism in contrast to what he
terms 'hot nationalism' - nationalism which is violent, out of control
and, importantly, which happens outside the Western, civilised world.
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Between banal and hot nationalism there is a clear colonial link:
nationalism, in its 'positive', banal form, appears as something which
is inherently Western, produced and originally practised in the civilised
realm of Western countries, whereas hot, violent nationalism thrives
on the edges of our civilisation. Drawing on this perspective of Billig's
research,1 1 will explore how state apparatus deals with situations of
thriving 'hot nationalism'. I argue that banalisation is a dynamic pro-
cess, a mechanism through which the state strives to reaffirm its own
political authority and reducing nationalism to what is seen as a mere
demonstration ot" patriotism. In this regard, the banalisation of nation-
alism is also a colonial phenomenon, a process through which the
societies which perceive themselves as the colonial 'Other' struggle to
emulate the political models of the Western world.
I take example of post-Dayton Serbia2 and two state campaigns
which were conducted between 1999 and 2010: the first one concerns
organising popular music events in public spaces during the NATO
bombing in 1999, and the other is the media and television campaign
of rebuilding the Avala TV Tower, destroyed in the NATO bombing of
2005. Both these situations can be described as 'hot nationalism'. In
the first example, during the final phase of Milosevic's regime in Serbia,
the country was ostracised by most of the international community,
while its administration was involved into forcible displacement and
other ethnically inspired crimes in the territory of its former autono-
mous province of Kosovo.3 In the second case, passionate nationalistic
discourse was not only present through dealing with the traumatic
legacy of NATO bombing, but also in connection with the open issue
of Kosovo's secession, which was interpreted as an onslaught on the
Serbian nation in toto.
In my analysis I look into the ways that the nationalistic project and
nation-state intertwine. Modern nationalism, based on the doctrine
of sovereignty and the idea of statehood is deeply ingrained in every
political project presenting itself as national (Yack 2012: 136). However,
practices of nationalism are continuously being formed and exercised
in-between state and private realms, and 'national identity' incorpo-
rates both a sense of belonging to the nation and a sense of loyalty to
the nation-state. Through my examples of the use of Western-styled
popular music genres in state campaigns in Serbia, I show how state
apparatus finds ways to appropriate sentiments provoked by the 'hot
nationalism' (produced in the private realm of 'national belonging')
through such mechanisms as banalisation, to solidify the attachment
of the individuals to the nation-state.
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In the first part of this chapter I review discourses of nationalism in
Serbian popular music in both Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav contexts.
I also consider music's positioning within Yugoslav and Serbian state
apparatus, in particular to point out purported 'Eastern' and 'Western'
allegiances of certain genres of Serbian popular music. This is of impor-
tance as most of the music which was used in the campaigns analysed
was originally produced in a different context, and continues to carry
existing meanings and connotations. I will then analyse two named
campaigns showing how mechanisms of banaiisation were employed
by recycling existing music. In my conclusion I will point to similari-
ties between these projects, notwithstanding their ostensibly different
political contexts.
Serbian popular music between the East and the West
Both of the projects that 1 examine resorted to 'recycled music' and
it is important to understand how the decisions what to recycle were
made and the symbolic legacy of the music which became part of these
campaigns. Serbian national identity has been riven with different
interpretations of notions of 'West' and 'East', a dichotomy constantly
used in the labelling of popular music genres. These labels, part of the
mechanisms of manipulating identities, were used as mechanisms of
governing, as a technology of power. From its inception in the early
nineteenth century, the intellectual elite defined Serbia's identity
as non-Ottoman/non-Eastern, in an effort to vindicate its territorial
enlargement at the expense of the empire in decline. This was especially
visible in the attitudes of various composers and ethnomusicologists
who strove to purify Serbian music by eliminating what they per-
ceived as Ottoman elements. However, in the context of Yugoslavia,
throughout the twentieth-century, Serbian identity was also defined as
non-Western, which in this instance was defined as 'traditional', pro-
Russian, Byzantine, and Orthodox Christian. This hecame especially
obvious in the 1990s, during the breakup of Yugoslavia, which was por-
trayed as the 'dungeon of the Serbian nation', and Western powers were
seen to be allying with the other sides in the conflict (Croats, Bosniaks,
Kosovars, etc.).
The creation of socialist Yugoslavia after the Second World War
entailed a significant curbing of the particular nationalisms of 'Yugoslav
nations', including Serbian, and their subordination to Yugoslav
patriotism which was reformulated through the Communist Part of
Yugoslavia's ideology of 'brotherhood and unity' (Calic2010: 180-183).
After the break with the Soviet Union in 1948, Yugoslavia increasingly
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tried to portray itself as a state where socialism had a more human face
and one more open to the influences from the West, including its popu-
lar music, which was by far more captivating than the Soviet-modelled
mass songs (Doknic 2013: 271-279; Markovic 1996; VuCetic 2006,
2012). Thus, while central government tried to curb perceived out-
bursts of particular nationalism within Yugoslavia, it fostered Western-
influenced popular music, first in the form of jazz and Italian pop and
afterwards global rock and roll. Already in 1948 the Communist Party's
attitude towards jazz (which was ostracised throughout the Soviet polit-
ical sphere of influence) became increasingly lenient, and in 1954 US
diplomats noted that 'surprisingly large space is awarded to American
jazz music' on the Yugoslav radio programmes (Markovic 1996: 475,
Vucetic 2006: 174-176). During the 1950s and 1960s a vast numbers
of songs performed by Yugoslav singers were translated and adapted
from Italian. Examples include No^ometna utakmica by Beti Jurkovic,
released by the Zagreb production company Jugoton in 1963, just a
year after the original Italian version La partita di pal lone (composed
by Edoardo Vianello and performed by the celebrated Rita Pavone).
Songs in similar fashion were widely arranged by Yugoslav composers
and made popular through a system of pop-music festivals modelled
on Sanremo, including ones in Opalija, Split, Belgrade, and Sarajevo.
From the mid-1960s, rock and roll started to dominate the Yugoslav
music scene, replacing both jazz and Sanremo festival-inspired popular
music, although it was sometimes perceived as subverting the socialist
regime, primarily because its promotion of sexual freedom went against
the regime's strict moral values, Yugoslav rock and roll was benefiting
from state financial and logistical support throughout the 1970s and
1980s. YU grupa presents a paradigmatic example, as one of the pio-
neering Yugoslav rock bands, formed in the autumn of 1969 (Ivackovic
2013: 162). Although promoting a music genre perceived as Western,
YU grupa integrated into the ideological apparatus of the socialist
Yugoslavia (for example, holding annual celebration concerts for the
Republic Day on 29 of November, symbolically the most important
holiday of the new regime) and by combining rock and folk music ele-
ments. The latter became known as 'shepherds' rock' ('pastirski rok'),
or 'folklore YU rock' (Dordevic 2002: 120) and was largely responsible
for the wide popularity of rock music in Yugoslavia, seemingly cutting
through the class barriers. It helped the Yugoslav state create the unique
image of a socialist state open to foreign influences and participation in
global popular and consumer culture and one which awards it citizens
with a latitude of 'freedom of expression'. Although dc facto part of the
state system, rock musicians still relied on semi-staged scandals, playing
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with the social taboos and even provoking some local censorship inci-
dents (Arnautovic 2012: 161). In this way they were able to present
themselves as the harbingers of new freedom in Yugoslav society. The
rock culture which developed in Yugoslavia can in general be regarded
as an example of 'colonial mimicry' (Bhabha 1994: 85), where this
society, which stood on the edge of the socialist realm of the Eastern
Europe, tried to participate in what was perceived as the free and civi-
lized world of the West, producing music which was 'almost the same,
but not quite'.
At the same time these, Western-styled popular music genres had
to compete in the market with so-called 'newly composed folk music'
(Uasmussen 2012). This was inspired by folk music (primarily of Serbia
and Bosnia), but the genre also relied on newly composed tunes,
arrangements drawing on pop-music models, as well as on 'stardom
effect' (Gledhill 1991) and the huge popularity of the leading per-
formers. Primarily characteristic of the Serbian scene where it quickly
became the most profitable music genre (Arnautovic 2012: 183), it
was repeatedly decried in public discourse, both by intellectuals and
party officials as backward and 'Eastern'. Moreover, it was associated
with the extensive migration from rural to urban areas, as part of the
great socialist project of industrialisation and hence was subjected
to rampant stigmatisation and discrimination (Kos 1972). Some of
the best-selling singles in former Yugoslavia's popular music history
were created by performers such as Tomislav (Toma) Zdravkovic, who
built his reputation on being a true melancholic bohemian of Serbian
kafanas, and Zilha Bajraktarevic (known as Silvana Armenulic), who
shocked the public with highly sexualised appearances in the media.
The 1980s saw a significant wave of Serbian nationalistic revivalism,
as the intellectual elite was frustrated by the Implementation of the
1974 constitution. This gave enhanced rights to the autonomous
provinces within Serbia, Vojvodina and Kosovo (off ic ia l ly 'Kosovo i
Metohija'), the latter populated by the Albanian majority who suppos-
edly started terrorising the Serbian minority (Sundhaussen 2007: 379).
Metanarratives of Serbian greatness such as the Kosovo myth, were
resurrected via reference to medieval Serbian history and First World
War narratives, where the Serbian nation was victimised, decimated,
but finally victorious in combat. Unlike Yugoslav rock and roll, the
newly composed folk music embraced this nationalistic turn. This was
achieved by incorporating First World War regalia into its visual rep-
resentations and by drawing on certain songs thematically connected
to these national narratives. A striking example was Predrag Zivkovic
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Tozovac's single feremija (1972), which controversially draw on narra-
tives of a victorious Serbian army in the First World War. Tozovac posed
on the sleeve in the pre-war uniform of the Kingdom of Serbia holding
a rifle, and for the reissue, in a semi-comic twist he even mounted a
heavy artillery gun. Some of the most poignant examples are songs and
compilations produced in connection with the six hundredth anniver-
sary of the battle of Kosovo Field, in 1989, which opportunely coin-
cided with the new rise of Serbian nationalism, for which the narrative
of this medieval battle has served as one of the cornerstone myths.
The celebration again strengthened this link between newly composed
folk music and Serbian nationalism. This is primarily reflected in the
immense popularity of the song Vidovdan ('St. Vitus' Day'), performed
by Gordana Lazarevic and composed by Milutin Popovic Zahar, which
became constant fixture of every social gathering, ranging from politi-
cal rally to wedding celebrations. The poignant verses of the song cre-
ate a sense of timelessness and speak of the protagonist's primordial
connection with the land of Kosovo, as a core part of the Serbian
national territory ('As the eternal flame in our hearts / The truth of
the Kosovo Battle remains / Wherever 1 go 1 come back to you / Who
could steal Kosovo from my soul'). Thus, newly composed folk music,
as the music genre which supposedly resisted the 'Westernisation' of
Yugoslavia, simultaneously evolved into the vehicle of increasingly
'hot' Serbian nationalism.
With the escalation of violence in Yugoslav territories during the
early 1990s, and increasingly belligerent Serbian nationalism, percep-
tion of Serbia as belonging to the 'Eastern' realm was particularly
accentuated. In the transformations which took place following a
deepening economic crisis, the production of folk music was handed
over to newly founded private market-orientated TV and production
companies. The Serbian popular music scene witnessed an aggres-
sive burgeoning of 'turbo-folk' music, a genre emanating from newly
composed folk music. Producers openly pursued popularity and profit
by drawing on music patterns found in the popular genres across the
Balkans and the Near East and ones characteristic of Western dance-
pop, as well as sex-and-violence and glittering media representations.
Songs by dance-pop performer Ivan Gavrilovic are often regarded as
the aesthetic manifestos of the new genre: 200 na sat ('200 km per
hour'), Moron ('Motorcycles') and Hot-it $ tobom dn diiskum ('I want
to dance with you') extol dangerous and sexually charged night-
life behaviour. Importantly, turbo-folk embraced female star singers
launching their careers as singers of newly composed folk music and
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introducing a genre of singing perceived as intrinsically folkloric and
'Eastern'. An example of this new blend is the song Crveno ('Red')
performed by Svetlana Ceca Raznatovic, where the singer pairs her
well-known singing style with its harsh t imbre and wide vibrato with
verses alluding to her precarious life style ('Go with me through the
red light / What is hers will be mine / Tie your eyes and do not brake').
The song video accompanying the song also featured a highly stylised
sexual performance.
The lack of the public support for the music industry had a devastat-
ing effect on rock music production, which was unsustainable in the
fragile market. As the musicians could not secure their incomes in the
new economic system, the market share of the genres which were per-
ceived as the Western-influenced dwindled. Turbo-folk was vehemently
deprecated by intellectuals, on similar grounds as newly composed folk
music, with the strong accentuation 'Eastern' sound, often referred
to as the Tehranisation' of Serbian (folk) music (Atanasovski 2012;
Kupres 2004). A number of intellectuals and musicians, correlated
the rise of turbo-folk with the nationalistic ethos of the belligerent
Milosevic regime. Certain musicians associated with this genre (such
as Mirko PajCin, known as 'Baja Mali Knindza') openly engaged in the
conflict, advocating the Serbian cause through blatant nationalistic
lyrics. Pajcin openly sympathised with Serbian paramilitary command-
ers in the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, expressing his nationalist and
xenophobic attitudes towards Croats and Bosniaks. Moreover he sup-
ported the far-right Serbian Radical Party, whose political programme
based on the irredentist project of so-called 'Greater Serbia', glorified
its controversial leader Vojislav SeSelj. Alhough Pajcin's stereotypi-
cally folkloric music style may seem prosaic, the appeal of his songs
is mostly produced by poignant verses which speak of Serbian racial
supremacy and historical victimhood ('Ever since God created humans /
always others come to judge us / always someone bothers the Serbs'),
often directly insulting or threatening members of other national com-
munities (Longinovic 2001: 639). Svetlana Ceca Raznatovic herself
became representative of these connections when she married Zeljko
Raznatovic Arkan, one of the main leaders of Serbian paramilitary
troops active in the war in Croatia and Bosnia. Some scholars argued
that Milosevic's regime itself produced or supported the rise of turbo-
folk in order to destroy the cultural alternatives to the Serbian nation-
alistic project (Gordy 1999; Kronja 2000). However, no proof of explicit
state involvement in the rise of turbo-folk can be found, and the
process can be explained solely through the effects of economic crises
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and the imposition of the market economy (Durkovic 2001). Thus, the
loss of cultural alternatives described by Gordy was a product of major
social and economic crises which mostly affected Western-influenced
music genres, incapable of sustaining their activities without the gov-
ernmental support they enjoyed in socialist Yugoslavia. 1 would argue
that the radical nationalistic examples of turbo-folk, although repre-
sentative of the ideological system which imposed itself as dominant
in contemporary Serbian society, cannot be regarded as a state project,
but more as instances of 'hot nationalism' operating outside the state
apparatus.
The Song Has Kept Us': public concert during
the NATO bombing
The NATO Bombing of Yugoslavia began on 24 of March 1999, just
a month after unsuccessful negotiations held in Rambouillet, where
the government of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia4 could not agree
with representatives of the Kosovo Albanians and the international
community, as it did not accept the NATO presence in Kosovo or the
possibility of holding an independence referendum after three years.
NATO unilaterally decided to bomb Yugoslavia in order to curtail
its military and policing capacities. While the campaign wrought
havoc on Kosovo, both because of intensive NATO bombardment and
because of intensified ethnic cleansing perpetrated by Serbian forces,
the mood in the capital of Belgrade was quite different. The citizens'
daily lives were disrupted with frequent emergency notices and schools
were closed. A major source of traumaiisation was the sonic experience
of the campaign. In the transfigured soitndscafH1 of the city relentless
sirens announced imminent danger followed by the sound of heavy
bombardment of military facilities and headquarters, political and gov-
ernment buildings in the city centre and on its outskirts.s The NATO
forces would occasionally employ so-called 'sound bombs', a sonic
effect of high-volume and deep-frequency caused by low-flying jets
breaking the sound barrier. Responding to this sonic terror (Goodman
2010) the government deployed strategies to mobilise the citizens of
Belgrade which were equally centred on the sound and sonic experi-
ence. Namely, the government organised public concerts of popular
music in the open spaces in most of the cities of Serbia proper. The
first concert was organised by Belgrade city council, on Sunday 28
March, just four days after the bombing started. Surprisingly, it was
concentrated solely on rock music, featuring the groups Elektricni
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orgazam, Deca losih muzicara, Bajaga i Instruktori and YU grupa, as
well as musicians such as Dejan Cukic and Rambo Amadeus. The musi-
cal style of these groups ranged from pop/rock to funk and (post-)
punk rock, most of which had gained popularity in socialist Yugoslavia.
Being quite immune to the rise of Serbian nationalism, these musi-
cians were often connected to the common cultural identity of former
Yugoslavia which permeated its rock scene. Previously mentioned YU
grupa had the longest career so far, and the one most clearly connected
with the former Yugoslav identity. The second generation of Yugoslav
rock was characterised by a mollified sound, often aligned with seem-
ingly depoliticised pop music. Such were Bajaga i Instruktori , whose
popularity was particularly urban and Belgrade-based, as well as rely-
ing on the charisma of their lead singer, MomiMlo Bajagic Bajaga, who
was particularly masterful in interpreting emotionally charged rock
ballads (Ivackovic 2013: 328-337). However, among the performers
present at the 28 March concert, Elektrieni orgazam was also a prime
representative of the third generation of Yugoslav rock, which accrued
their popularity in the late 1980s. Renouncing any folk conceptions of
'shepherds' rock', they built their image on an aggressive rock sound
and often politically engaged verses criticising contemporary Yugoslav
society. Openly dissident, they became part of mainstream Yugoslav
rock, illustrating the purported openness of this state-socialist society
(Arnautovic 2012: 163). Thus, the 28 March concert in Belgrade can be
interpreted as an event where the full kaleidoscope of Yugoslav rock
was relocated in its time, space, and meaning: the songs performed
were mostly at least a decade old, and originally representative of the
pro-Western values of Yugoslav socialist society. Here they were per-
formed in an entirely new context, in a novel state whose governing
apparatus reckoned with their accrued popularity and utilised them
to banalise a highly charged political situation. This concert, which
proved to be only the first in a series of daily organised events, was
especially memorable because of to intense affective atmosphere in
which musicians played despite air raid warnings. As a truly surprising
event, the concert articulated the feelings of fear of both performers
and the audience at the gathering thereby transforming them into a
form of therapeutic defiance (Grujicic 1999).
The government pushed forward the idea of organising public con-
certs throughout the NATO campaign on a daily basis. Besides the
daytime concerts organised in the centre of Belgrade by the city council
under the slogan The Song Has Kept Us, the two ruling parties staged
night-time concerts on two important Belgrade bridges, purportedly to
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serve as a living shield dispelling the danger of their destruction. The
exclusively rock music character of the concerts did not last, but nei-
ther was a certain musical selection maintained. As the programme slid
into musical mainstream and mishmash, including turbo-folk perform-
ers, most of the musicians invited by the government to perform felt
forced to comply (Mira Skoric statement in Kupres 2004). While public
support for the initiative started to dwindle, which was reflected in the
numbers of visitors which seemed to wane from day to day, the organis-
ers tried to gather as large an audience as possible by bringing pop rock
stars Zdravko Colic and Dorde Balasevic to play on the 11 April, Easter
day. Somewhat similar to Momcilo Bajagic, Zdravko Colic and Dorcle
BalaSevic rose to great popularity in 1970s and 1980s respectively,
positioning themselves as seemingly apolitical figures and appealing to
a wide audience. The emblematic songs which were repeated through
these concerts were published on a CD featuring the target logo that
became an emblem of this campaign of supposed popular resistance.
Published by anonymous ad hoc 'Target rekords', the CD was widely
sold on the streets during the concerts and reflected their repertoire.
Again, one notes the dominant presence of former Yugoslavian rock
music, either left unchanged or adapted for this special purpose. The
meaning of old Yugoslav rock, which was perceived as cosmopoli-
tan, was here relocated into processes of banalisalion of the Serbian
nationalistic cause. The songs featuring by then the futile messages of
Yugoslav identity, as the one built on youthful energy and cosmopoli-
tan values (which was very much in dispute with the turbo-folk genre),
such as /xra roken ml cela fngoslavija {'The whole of Yugoslavia is dancing
to rock and roll music') played by the Elektriciii orgazam, dominate the
compilation, which attracted their wide popularity. Some songs accrued
different meaning in a changed context: the song Avionn slomicu ti krila
('Airplane, I'll break your wings') by former Yugoslav rock band Riblja
corba originally features a love theme (in which the 'breaking of the
wings' of the passenger jet was used to express the protagonist's desire
to be with his loved one). However the song's meaning was reinscribed
via allusions to the shooting down of enemy planes, regularly reported
in the media and widely celebrated. A special place was awarded to
the song Rin$ispn ('Carousel') by Dorde BalaSevic, who wrote new
war-themed lyrics to this popular love song from 1991. The original
song, written in a formulaic and dreary singer-songwriter style, was
structured as a call to a former lover to reappear and 'add some colour'.
Balasevic's interventions were mostly concentrated on the opening two
stanzas, which set the melancholic mood in which 'it's all the same' to
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the protagonist. Indeed, Balasevic uses the song's exaggerated melan-
cholia to depict the imminent danger of the war as a mere nuisance and
comparable to rain, thus using a love ballad as an instrument to dilute
the seriousness of the precarious political situation. Specially produced
songs with banal, patriotic verses were also added to this compilation,
such as }a volim svoju zemlju ('I love my country'), produced by City
Records and featuring an array of pop and folk singers, and Samo sloga
Srbina spasuvu ('Only unity saves the Serbs'), featuring Riblja corba and
rock musicians Bajaga and Dejan Cukic. It is evident (hat iliis repertoire
conforms to the idea of 'banal nationalism'. Moreover, its banality is
seen as kind of therapeutic vehicle which transforms the trauma of
sound and fear provoked by the NATO bombing into complacency and
stupor.
Dorde Balasevic, Ringityil, first two stanzas, original version (1991) and war-time
version (1999)
It's raining this morning since four They're heating this morning since four
or five, or five,
the sky decided to flood the world NATO decided to change the world
over the city for days over the city for days
more of the same scenery. fly of the same rockets.
Pouring rain, Pouring NATO,
hut that's his thing, hut that's his thing
hey, it's all same to me, hey, it's all same to me
fla t like the north of the Banat, f la t like the north of the Banat,
more or less, there'll he war,
both with and without rain. so be it, we end up same.
'Let's Raise the Tower at the Avala'
After the fall of Milosevic's regime in 2000, Serbian citizens were
strongly divided between the poles of the nationalistic and pro-
Western/pro-European cause, with the rift between generations being
particularly pronounced. One could argue that the rift between sup-
porters of Milosevic's regime on the one hand, and its opponents on
the other, was so wide that the integrity of the nation was brought to
question. Members of these two poles defined themselves and allied
to specific causes not only by using specific political rhetoric, but also
by using patterns of cultural consumption to identify themselves.
In the late 1990s, rock music was clearly associated with resistance
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against Milosevic's regime, with examples of outspoken criticism
present in the works of some of the rock musicians (Mijatovic 2008).
Music also occupied a prominent place in the anti-Milosevic street
protests, where some rock musicians and performers took part in the
rallies and recorded songs with political and satirical verses. From the
point of view of members of Milosevic's opposition, it was regarded
as natural and expected that rock musicians, who were pro-Western
cosmopolites, unlike the turbo-folk performers, were among those
who opposed Milosevic's regime and the nationalistic and aggressive
militant culture it represented. The ethos of rock music, as original,
individual, and, last but not the least, pro-Western, was opposed to
folk music on a political as well as on an aesthetic level. Folk singers
purportedly continued with the Tehranisation' of Serbian music and,
as individuals, they were either seemingly apolitical, connected to the
ruling parties of the Milosevic regime (such as Zorica Brunclik, promi-
nent member of Yugoslav Left), or involved with famous nationalistic
figures (such as Svetlana Ceca Raznatovic). The rock musicians, such
as Rambo Amadeus, Darkwood Dub, and Eyesburn (Mijatovic 2008),
not only gave their support to the anti-Milosevic movement, but also
used their music aesthetic to back the protests. Particularly prominent
was Dragoljub Duricic, reputedly one of the leading rock drummers of
former Yugoslavia (formerly working with YU grupa, Leb i Sol, Kerber,
and as a member Zdravko Colic's and Dorde Balasevic's bands), who
embarked with projects in progressive rock based solely on percussion
instruments. Playing portable drums in a percussion ensemble with
his associates, Duricic gained recognition by actually leading the street
protest marches.
I would argue that the purpose of the project of rebuilding the Avala
TV Tower was to answer the challenges of homogenising a divided
nation by restoring the authority of the state. It also helped to banalise
the new wave of Serbian nationalism stemming from dissatisfaction with
the Kosovo secession, which led to the fall of Milosevic. In this process,
relocating the rock music - and more so, the musicians themselves -
from an anti-Milosevic position to seemingly legitimising the rejuve-
nated Serbian state - proved to be one of the crucial mechanisms. The
Avala TV Tower was originally constructed between 1961 and 1965
and was the tallest structure in the Balkans, located on the outskirts of
Belgrade. It was destroyed on 29 April 1999 during the NATO bombard-
ment of Serbia. The campaign to re-erect the tower, which commenced
in 2004, was permeated with the ethos of repulsion and repudiation
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towards the NATO bombardment, and the very act of rebuilding was to
symbolise an annulment of the consequences of the action, the most
serious being the secession of Kosovo. Importantly, the campaign was
launched following violent unrest in Kosovo in March 2004, when
many Serbian landmarks and buildings were torn down and part of
Serbian population left the province, contributing lo the anxiety of the
remaining population and to the overall discontent of nationalists in
Belgrade.
Although heavy financial and logistical support came from the state
government, I he funding mechanisms of the project tended to produce
a semblance of private or non-governmental initiative. Radio Television
of Serbia broadcast a series of live TV shows featuring SMS donations
from the audience, and citizens were invited to help the project, foster-
ing a feeling of solidarity towards a 'people's' cause. The restoration of
the Avala TV Tower was imbued with emotional significance for many
Belgrade citizens who were used to seeing this prominent structure in
their everyday life as part of the healing process after the traumatic
experience of NATO bombing. The reconstruction of Avala TV Tower
is significant as it claimed to symbolically overwrite the effects and
memory of NATO bombing, thereby restoring the unity of the state ter-
ritory and reconstituting Serbian 'homeland' as an organic whole. This
strategy of erasing history was prominent in the city mayor's opening
speech, where he noted that it is was as if the tower was shrouded in
mist for all these years, and only now could be seen clearly again. The
tower symbolically and physically represented the organic unity of
Serbian national territory, as (almost) all the parts can be thence seen
in clear weather, as emphasised in the speech of one of the members of
the cabinet on the same occasion.
Musical products incorporated into the project included a prominent
musical video regularly featured on Radio Television of Serbia, a CD
issued by national broadcasting agency (PGP RTS), as well as perfor-
mances at the opening which was broadcast live from the scene. The
release of another CD was planned, for which there was to be a poetry
competition for schools and prominent musical stars were to write the
music for selected verses, but the project was never completed. Music
videos used in the fund-raising campaign give the first significant clue
to how different social groups, defined in terms of musical and political
preferences and lifestyle, were encouraged to participate in the project.
The music video Avalski toranj ('Avala TV Tower') used to promote the
rebuilding of Avala TV Tower, produced by RTS, features Bora Dordevic
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and Dragoljub Duricic, both open crilics of the Milosevic's regime in
the 19'90s. Also present, was a younger star 2eljko Joksimovic who owes
most of his fame to the 2004 Eurovision Song Contest and is perceived
as an apolitical person. The music video bears an uncanny resemblance
to the concerts organised during the bombing, as the location where the
video was filmed is the ruins of the former TV tower emphasising the
circumstances and aftermath of the NATO campaign (see Figure 3.1).
The music composed by Kornelije Kovac, a well-known pop and rock
composer, fuses important features of rock, thus appealing to the urban
young and middle-aged population (Cveticanin 2007; Dragicevic-Sesic
1994). The lyrics were written by Ljubivoje Rsumovic, a famous chil-
dren's poet, again perceived as an apolitical person. However, as can be
concluded through an analysis of its rhetoric, the verses are far from
apolitical even though they cling to a banal, ambivalent blend of com-
monplace tropes:
The godless devils have managed
to separate us from the world.
They destroyed the three-legged tower,
Belgrade remained without its flag.
I-]
We want a life without barriers
and the life wants us to be free!
This lightning rod over Belgrade
Defends us from the world's loneliness
While the first stanza clearly refers to the NATO bombing, and mobilises
negative emotions connected to this event, the third stanza portrays the
Serbian nation as a modern state integrated within the international
community. The trope of a 'life without barriers' is also a clear reference
to anti-Milosevic rhetoric used in 2000. The song featured clear, stereo-
typical, one might say vacuous references to rock music, such as the
prominent role of the electric guitar and strong drum beats, which was
also supported by the visual and performative level in the music video.
These features, once a cachet of free expression, were here relocated into
the new ideological system of post-Milosevic Serbia, where rebuilding
projects such as this one were not seen as overtly nationalistic, but as
depoliticised or simply 'patriotic' (Figure 4.1).
The CD that accompanied the project and the fund-raising campaign
was made to appeal to the widest possible audience, but again in a way
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figure 4.1 Cover of the CD Avalaski toranj (Avala tower), 2006
to reflect the odium towards folk music. The compilation was made
from popular songs by musicians who agreed to join the fund-raising
campaign, some of them appearing as performers on the previously
discussed single which also figures as the title number on this CD.
Musicians listed on this compilation again present a blend of well-
known artists who were either apolitical or had openly allied with the
anti-Milosevic cause (in this respect, an important addition to Dordevic
and Duricic is the name of Dorde BalaSevic). Interestingly, a number
of performers connect this CD with the one issued by Target Rekords
during the bombing. By analysing the songs, it can be concluded that
mainstream rock performers make up most of the artists, but the songs
15 chosen from their repertoire to be included in the compilation
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were closer to pop music in style, appealing to wider audiences and
not only to rock music lovers. In this way, the symbolic capital of rock
music, as the 'Western' genre, rebellious, original and individualised,
was preserved, while the compilation, at the same time could please
the widest possible audience. As the March 1999 concert in Belgrade
shows, rock music was relocated and recontextualised as an instrument
of banal Serbian nationalism, supporting seemingly innocuous rebuild-
ing projects, which nevertheless had a strong territorial agenda. In this
example through the processes of relocation the impact and aesthetic
consequences were much stronger. The banalisation of the nation
entailed the banalisation of the rock music itself, which was further
accentuated with additions of songs performed by pop musicians from
the pre-rock era as well as children's pop songs.
Conclusion
In his study, Billig scrutinised the case of Western, first world countries,
which do not usually feature in studies of nationalism. However, study-
ing popular music as the instrument of banalisation implies that there
is something intrinsically 'Western' in nationalism as the dominant
governing ideology of the globalised world. Not only did the modern
ideology of the nationalism originally develop in the advanced countries
of the West, but also the 'progressive' and desirable forms of national-
ism, are continuously perceived as something that should be modelled
on successful Western nations, emulating their cultural patterns. In
order to impose their authority, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
Republic of Serbia recycled almost exclusively Western-sty led popular
music which was originally perceived as non- or even anti-nationalistic,
transmitting the modernising values of the Western world. Western-
influenced popular music was relocated from its original context and
ascribed with new meanings of banal patriotism. Relocated into the
newly formulated state campaigns, it was used in order to mollify the
'hot' nationalistic practices and to attract a wider audience consisting of
all generations. It seems like, while all hot nationalisms are hot in their
own way, the only way to create banal nationalism is by adopting and
recycling products of popular culture in general, and music in particu-
lar, by which a nation-state can become widely recognised as Western,
modern, and progressive.
The two campaigns described in this chapter bear many resemblances:
a CD was produced saturated with recycled Western-styled popular
music; an emblematic music video was specifically produced and
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continually screened on state television; an array of rock and 16 pop
rock musicians was mobilised in a seemingly unproblematic cause. The
importance of the banality of everyday experience is affirmed in both
cases: the two campaigns were both in a way a response to the disruption
of the everyday experience of the population, either by the 'sonic war' of
NATO in Belgrade, or by the pronounced absence of the TV tower that
the citizens of the capital were used of seeing in the landscape. In both
cases, campaigns struggled to make changes in the realm of everyday,
either by staging a public concert as a counterweight to the sonic war, or
by restoring the all too familiar vista. As dictionaries do not define banal
simply as mundane, unmarked, but specifically insist on the quality of
lacking originality and the complete absence of novelty and freshness,
these examples also show that banal nationalism is similarly not some-
thing which just happens every day or which has lost all immediate
appeal.6 For practices of banal nationalism to function and truly serve
their purpose of reaffirming nation-state authority, they have to be
based on cultural practices which themselves lack originality, which are
recycled relics of popular practices or products which have either lost or
changed their original purpose. The Western-styled popular music used
in this stale campaign has thus not only lost its originality, but has itself
become banalised as a part of the state apparatus, and its original mean-
ing as a type of music which allows 'freedom of expression' has been
lost through the described processes of relocation and its submission to
the state apparatus. The genres such as rock and roll, which had previ-
ously served as markers of individual freedom, have now been relocated
into the new political post-socialist context of the Serbian nation-state
struggling to affirm its authority. Even more specifically, they were relo-
cated onto the very sights of national traumatic experiences - the urban
spaces as the potential targets of NATO bombing and the devastated
ruins of sites which had been bombed - and used to hanalise these very
sites and the sonic and visual trauma connected to them.7 Finally, by
relocating these popular music genres from their original context into
new spatiotemporal realities, they not only lost part of their aesthetic
appeal, but they also become divested of their political purpose.
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Notes
1. The importance of Billing's contribution notwithstanding, in recent years
scholars have been re-evaluating the impact of his approach on nationalism
studies, Craig Calhoun (2014) rightfully concludes that the applications of
Billing's banal nationalism were mostly about retracing the steps of Billing's
research and providing an array of case studies reaffirming his argument,
rather than dealing with the important consequences of his conclusions.
Calhoun notices that by merely describing how 'the world of nations' is
reaffirmed through banal practices, not only do we fail to come closer to
the answer to how it got formed in the first place, but we can even become
complicit in its making. The issue was also addressed by Rhys Jones and I'etcr
Merriman, who note that Billig's account also implies a 'separation between
the banal and hot processes that reproduce nationalism' (Jones and Merriman
2009: 165), and try to put emphasis on the notion of everyday nationalism,
whereas certain practices can be interpreted both as 'banal' and 'hot', depend-
ing on the wider social and discursive context.
2. The Dayton Agreement signed in November 1995 (Slobodan Milosevic
being one of the signatories) brought the end to the conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, several months after fighting in Croatia also ended. In the
following year, Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (consisting of Serbia and
Montenegro) recognised the sovereignty of Croatia and Rosnia-Her/egovina.
Using the term 'post-Dayton Serbia' 1 wish to emphasise that silent disavowal
of its role in these conflicts (and in encouragement of the belligerent Serbian
nationalism in general) is one of the constants in Serbian state politics
from the Dayton Agreement to this day, and that it runs through both the
Milosevic and post-Milosevic periods.
3. Cf. Appeal Judgement Summary for Sainovic et al., International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (2014) http://www,lcty,org/x/cases/
milutinovic/acjug/en/140123. .suminary.pdf.
4. Quite1 different from the communist Socialist federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, founded in 1992, consisted only of Serbia
and Montenegro, the republics which did not choose to leave the combined
Yugoslav state (unlike Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia).
In this period, its government was strongly associated with Milosevic's regime.
He acted as the federation's president between 1997 and2000. In 2003, this
polity changed its name to to the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro and
finally ceased to exist with secession of Montenegro in 2006.
5. This is not to claim that there were no casualties, and NATO's official nam-
ing of these with the term 'collateral damage' was received with indignation.
I'articularly exposed by media was the death of three-year-old Milica Rakic
who was killed by shrapnel during the bombing of a military facility in the
outskirts of Belgrade and the most notorious was the death of 16 workers at
Radio Television of Serbia when its building was bombed on 23 April. The
director of television, Dragoljub Milanovic, was later convicted for not evacu-
ating people from the building, and the families of the victims expressed
their belief that they served as victims to bring international attention to
unjustified targets in the NATO bombing campaign (Vasic 2012). During the
bombing (and afterwards) Belgrade residents remained largely oblivious to
the simultaneous crimes of government forces in Kosovo.
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6. The etymology of banal provides an equally useful tale: stemming from
the mid-eighteenth century, it was originally related to feudal service and
meant what was 'compulsory' and hence 'common to all' (Hoad 1996). Not
surprisingly, banal nationalistic practices serve the purpose of inscribing
the compulsory 'national identity' onto the population of the state, reaf-
firming the authority of the nation-state and enabling the governing of the
population.
7. The analysis of the campaigns also provides us with an important insight
pertaining lo the ways in which .Serbian nationalism deals with recent con-
flicts. Namely, both campaigns were directly aimed at hiding the belligerent
nature of Serbian nationalism and the wry picture of the 1999 conflict can be
construed as a part of the hanallsed narrative advocated by the Serbian state.
It excludes the insight into the reasons which led to the NATO bombing and
information on the actions of Serbian troops towards the Albanian popula-
tion in Kosovo. Not only was this the case in 1999, but it continues to be so
even in the present day, when the everyday landscape of Belgrade with its
flagship Avala TV Tower was restored.
Works cited
'Appeal Judgement Summary for Sainovic et al., International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia' (2014). http://www.icty.Org/x/cases/milutinovic/
acjug/en/ 140123_summary.pdf (accessed 31 August 2014)
Arnautovic, Jelena (2012). Iziwdit pottttkc i trZista. I'opularna muzika no Rutiio-
ISeognuhi u SFRI (Beograd: Radio-televi/ija Srhije).
Atanasovski, Srttan (2012). 'Turbo-folk as "bad music": Politics of musical
valuing' , in Sara It. Palke and Kathar ina Wisot/ki (eds), Rave Mtuiit Mttsik. Zur
Asthetik tics Hosim in der Musik (Bielefeld: Transcript), pp. 157-172.
Bhabha, Honii K. (1994). The Location of Culture (London and New York:
Routledge).
H i l l i g , Michael (1995). Banal Nationalism (London: Sage).
Calic, Marie-Jaiiine (2010). Geschichte fugoslawiens itn 20. lahrtmndcrt (Miinchen:
C.H.Beck)
Calhoun, Craig (2014). Keynote address at the Everyday Nationhood symposium,
8th September, Itirkbeck College, University of London. http://youtubc/
aS!UV4LQjlQ (accessed 31 August 2014)
Cveticanin, i'rcdrag (2007). Kulturnc potrcbe, navike i ukus gradana Srbife i
Mukedonije (Nis: Odbor /.a gradansku inicijativu).
Doknic, Branka (2013). Kulturna politika Ittgoslavije 1946-1963 (Beograd: Sliizbcni
glasnik).
Dordcvic, Radomir (2002). Lcksikon potkultura (Nis: Zograf)
Dragicevic-Sesic, Milena (1994). Neofolk kultnrn: I'ltbiiku i njene zveziie (Sremski
Karlovci and Novi Sad: Izdavacka knji/arnica Zorana Stojanovica).
Durkovic, Mi5a. (2001). 'Ideologizaclja turbo-folka', Kultiira 102r pp. 19-33.
Ciledhill, C'hristine (ed.) (1991). Stardom: Industry of Desire (London and New
York: Routledge).
Goodman, Steve (2010). Sonic Warfare: Sound, Affect, and the Ecology of Fear
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Recycled Music for Banal Nation 103
Gordy, Erie I). (1999) The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism ami the Destruction
of Alternatives (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press).
Grujifiid, NehojSa (1999) Tri£c u send rata (3). Ko to tamo peva?', Vretne 443,
3 July 1999. http://www.vreme.com/arhiva_html/443/H).html (accessed 31
August 2014)
Hoad, T. K, ed. (1996). Tlie Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology (Oxford:
Oxford University Press),
Ivackovic, Ivan (2013). Kako snto propevali. Jugoslavija i n'/ena inuiika (ISeograd:
I.aguna).
Jones, Rhys, and Peter Merriman (2009). 'Hot, banal and everyday nationalism:
Bilingual road signs in Wales', Political Geography 2&, pp. 164-173.
Kos, Koraljka (1972), 'New dimensions in folk music: A contribution to the study
of musical tastes in contemporary Yugoslav society', International Review of the
Aesthetics and Sociology of Music 3, pp. 61-73.
Kronja, Ivana (2000). Smrtonosni sjaj: masovna psihologija i cstetika turbo-folka
(Beograd: Tehnokratija).
Kupres, Radovan (2004). Sav taj folk, TV documentary (Belgrade: Television B92),
I.onginovic, Tomislav (2001). 'Music wars: Blood and song at the end of
Yugoslavia', in Ronald M. Radano and Philip V. Bohlman (eds), Musk and
the Racial Imagination (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press),
pp, 622-643.
Markovic, Prcdrag J. (1996). Beograd izmedu istoka i zapada 1948-1965 (Beograd:
Slu/hcni list SRJ).
Mijatovic, Brana (2008). ' "Throwing Stones at the .System": Rock Music in
Serbia during the 1990s,' Music & Politics 2. http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/
mp.9460447.0002.203 (accessed 31 August 2014)
Rasmussen, I.jerka V. (2012). Newly Composed Folk Musk of Yugoslavia (New York
and London: Routlcdgc).
Sundhaussen, Holm (2007), Gescllichte Serbiens. 19-21. fahrliuitdert (Wien, Koln
and Weimar; Btihlau Verlag).
Vasic, Biljana (2012). 'Sto godina samoce', Vrerne (1131), 6 September 2012.
http;//www.vremc.com/cms/view.php'/id=1070972 (accessed 3! August 2014).
VuCetie, lladina (2006). 'Rokenrol na Zapadu Istoka. Slucaj Dzuboks', Godisn/ak
za dniStvenu istoriju 13, pp. 71-88.
VuSetid, Kadtna (2012). Koka-kola socijaliztini (Beograd: Slu/.beni glasnik).
Yack, Bernard (2012). Nationalism and the Moral Psychology of Community (Chicago
and London: University of Chicago I'rcss).
